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Ancient Greek Philosophy and Present-Day Pbenomenology 
Tadashi OGAWA 
In memoriam Norio FUJISAWA 
In philosophical thought, ancient Greek philosophy is regarded as a paradigm 
which represents classical ancient times. In its clarity, simplicity, fundamentality, 
objectivity, and materiality (Sache), it does, no doubt, surpass any of the various 
thought belonging to the other ancient cultural spheres such as India, China, and 
Mesopotamia. For us Japanese living in the Far-East, ancient Greek philosophy is taken 
as a universal model of philosophical thought, and is widely accepted and researched. lt 
can be said, indeed, that ancient Greek philosophy is a paradigm not for classical 
ancient times exclusively but for philosophy in general. 
Phenomenology was first given solid foundations by Edmund Husserl, who, as is 
well-known, got his fundamental concept of intentionality from his teacher, Franz 
Brentano, a well-known Aristotelian scholar. Brentano attempted to interpret 
Aristotelianism in the light of intentionality. Archbishop Groeber sent Brentano's 
dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles to Martin 
Heidegger, who was trying to give phenomenology conceptual self-understanding and a 
framework. Thereafter Heidegger made frequent reference to Brentano's dissertation in 
his philosophical writings, and it was precisely because he expected Brentano's 
questions to be more decisively dealt with in Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen that 
he began to take an interest in Husserl. Although Husserl might not have read Plato in 
the original Greek texts, he had much respect and sympathy for Platonic philosophy all 
his life. Thus it is evident that the movement of phenomenological thought was 
destined to be firmly bound to Greek philosophy from the beginning. 
Our question is what meaning and influence does Greek philosophy have on 
phenomenology in the nineteen-eighties, and what kind of philosophical results worth 
considering have sprung from various philosophical researches into Greek philosophy. 
Norio FUJISAWA, the representative Japanese specialist in Greek philosophy, 
has published books with titles which deal with: Greek Philosophy and the Present Day 
(lwanami-shoten, Tokyo: 1980) and Forms and World (Iwanami-shoten, 1980). The 
latter is a collection of specialized dissertations, which should reinforce the former. 
Apart from his translations of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Sextus Empiricus into 
Japanese, he has edited and translated all the works of Plato taken down by his 
disciples. He is known abroad as the author of ""Exc1v, ME-r~XEtv, and Idioms of 
,Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms" (Phronesis, XIX: 1974). But no one in 
Japan has ever discussed the significance of his Platonic researches for 
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phenomenology. Therefore my task is to elucidate some phenomenological insights that 
his Platonic theories contain. For convenience I will refer to Fujisawa's Greek 
Philosophy and the Present Day as (a) and to Formsand World as (b). lt is in (b) that 
the essence of his fundamental ideas is revealed. What matters most for our immediate 
purpose is Chapter I : "Words" and Chapter II : "Raison d'etre of Metaphysics." The 
principal view of (a) is that ancient atomism together with Aristotelianism has 
established modern science. We can say in general that Fujisawa attempts to make 
Platonism confront Aristotelianism, while always conscious of the modern scientific 
view of the world. 
In fact, Fujisawa thinks that Aristotelianism permeates not only contemporary 
interpretations of Plato but philosophical research in general. His task is to criticize and 
expose this implicit Aristotelianism. He interprets it as a theory of parallelism, 
Subject/Predicate = Substance/ Attribute, and insists that Aristotelian logico-ontological 
conceptions infiltrated the Platonic philosophy in the Occidental philosophical 
tradition. ((b)p.97) He states as follows: lt was Aristotle who described the expression 
from, "S is P" as "P is predicated of s" or "P belongs to s." The latter form of 
expression leads to declaring the fact that an Attribute exists by depending on 
Substance (Substratum). Aristotle thought this applicable in describing the world, too. 
((b )p.43) 
We could summarize Fujisawa's views as follows: The fundamental function of 
words consists of "hypostatization," and with this, discrimination. lt is not until we 
hypostatize and materialize a thing that we can cope with it. Probably this is the origin 
of scientific thoughts. "A green leaf," for example, can be divided into "green" and 
"leaf' only on the verbal level, which tends to give us an illusion that this separation 
can also happen in the "real" world. To deprive "leaf' of "green" in reality means, 
however, the extinction of the leaf itself. In the perceptual dimension we can find no 
one-sided relations of dependence such as Subject/Predicate (Adjective) or 
Substance/Attribute; "green" depends on "leaf," just as "leaf' depends on "green." 
What we find here is the relation of inter-dependence, of inter-founding. Owing to the 
magical mechanism of the words, we are obliged to accept the distinction of 
Substance/ Attribute. Since this introduces atomism and materialism, it forms a 
substantial motive for the various premises of possibility which modern science 
possesses. Originally, ancient Greek was a language which occasionally dispensed with 
Subject: that was especially the case with the personal pronoun. (In this way Japanese 
resembles ancient Greek.) Therefore, the form of predication (Subject/Predicate) which 
most of the modern European languages possess derives, according to Fujisawa, from 
the post-Aristotelian philosophy and tradition. "lt was Aristotle who strongly 
emphasized Subject and who put the formula Subject/Predicate = Substance/ Attribute 
at the center ofthought for the understanding of the world." ((b)p.33) 
Hence Fujisawa came to seek a Platonism released from Aristotelianism. His de-
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Aristotelianization of Plato means exactly to interpret Plato independently without 
being influenced by Aristotelianism; what Bergson criticizes, mouvement retrograde du 
vrai, naturally does not apply to Fujisawa's interpretation. In order to prove the 
authenticity of the so-called Aristotelian parallelism Subject/Predicate=Substance/ 
Attribute, Fujisawa examines one of Plato's thoughts on Form, namely the theory of 
methexis. His interpretation of methexis is that an individual or a thing exists by having 
(echon) some .quality because the individual at the same time participates in 
(metechein) the Form. The theory, however, unwillingly supports Aristotelianism in the 
sense that establishing the Individual leads to establishing the Subject. Therefore for 
Fujisawa the point to be resolved is the elimination of the Individual in order to 
establish no Subject. Fujisawa actually settles the problem by replacing the theory of 
methexis with that of paradeigma. And he attempts to prove against Owenn that the 
Timaios is a later work, one just before Leges, the last one. In the Timaios the theory of 
Space (chora) appears and both the Individual and methexis are effaced. 
Thus the "Individual" being eliminated, the question of the relationship between 
Form and Quality has to be asked. The material substance of the Individual disappears 
and is re-grasped Here (hie) in the wholeness of Space. The Quality of Here which 
exists as a part of the whole of Space accepts and reflects Form. In his English 
dissertation mentioned above Fujisawa writes in this way: "In this part of Space the 
Form of Beauty is imaged." or "An Image of the Form of Beauty has now come into 
this part of Space." ( emphasis mine) lt may be interesting to note that in his Japanese 
dissertation he uses the word Utsushidasu (mirror) instead of "image" (v.) and the word 
Arawareru (appear) instead of "come into." This difference of phraseologies in the 
English and the Japanese versions indicates that Fujisawa is conservative as a Platonic 
interpreter in his English version, but is very near to phenomenology in his Japanese 
version. I think his deeper intention rather lies in the latter. Fujisawa takes as an 
example "water": it is not that there is a substantial "thing" called "water" here but that 
the form of water as its quality "appears" and "mirrors" in the Here which is a part of 
the whole of Space. In his view, Forms are the standard for judging reality, and are 
therefore its pre-empirical, almost transcendentally ultimate reason. This view makes it 
even more apparent that Fujisawa is in the main thinking along the lines of 
phenomenology. The world as the horizontal wholeness or the world as the Horizon 
synthesizing different horizons means the totality of Space (chora), where everything is 
co-related without having either substantiality, individuality or reality. This parallels 
the phenomenology of the life-world. (Cf Husserl, Krisis, Husserliana, VI. The Hague: 
1955. pp.146, 165, 173, 267) lt is exactly in this part of Space (chora) that something 
appears; Form ( <I>) appears as "F" (Quality). Form ( <I>) gives ground for the 
discrimination that F is F and that F is absolutely distinct from any other qualities such 
as G, H, and I. 
We could, in fact, reinterpret Fujisawa's interpretation of Form in the light of 
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appearance-theory (Erscheinungstheorie) in contemporary phenomenology. 
Next, let us turn toward Germany. Among contemporary German 
phenomenologists Klaus Held deals with the theme "ancient Greek philosophy and 
modern phenomenology" more in depth than any other scholar. In his first book, 
Lebendige Gegenwart, (The Hague: 1966), he elucidates Husserl's thought on time, the 
most difficult but at the same time the most profound in the whole of Husserlian 
phenomenology. Held deals not only with Husserl 's published texts but with his 
unpublished manuscripts of the nineteen-thirties. He has made sharp and elaborate 
structural analyses of the "stopping and flowing present" (strömende und stehen-
bleibende Gegenwart). 
In his second book, Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft, Berlin - New York 1980, he summons the pre-Socratic philosophers onto 
the stage of contemporary phenomenological discussion. This book has double 
obstacles to obtaining a wide range of readers not only in Japan but also in the United 
States and perhaps in Germany, because philologists of ancient languages on the one 
hand, and phenomenologists on the other, are rarely conversant with each other. Indeed, 
to understand this book fully, a reader must be simultaneously and to some extant 
versed in both of these difficult fields. My task in this short essay is to summarize the 
essence of Held's book and to indicate some controversial points. 
Held stands very close to Husserl in the sense that he tries to elucidate the 
relation between pre-philosophic life, science, and philosophy. He calls this attitude 
"Relation-Thinking" (Verhältnis-Denken). Only, what he aims at is a transcendental-
historic phenomenology which includes the pre-transcendental dimension. 
His basic approach is to consider the various relations between pre-philosophic 
life (Heraclitus) and metaphysics. The contents of his book fall into the following 
divisions: l. The Beginning of Philosophy and Science as an Object of Our Interest; II . 
Heraclitus: The Beginning Thought Differs from Pre-philosophic Life; III . Parmenides: 
Preparation for Metaphysics. In Chapter I Held reanalyzes the fundamental concepts of 
Life World phenomenology. Moreover, as an expert Husserlian scholar, he leads us to a 
reconstitution of such important concepts as "Passive Genesis," "Perspective," 
"Intentionality," and "Horizon." His phenomenological interest lies in elucidating the 
"between-ness" of fulfillment (Vollzug) and object (Vorliegendes) in the tensional field 
of intentionality. This "between-ness" constitutes the appearing modes of given-ness 
(Gegebenheitsweise), which open the pre-Cartesian dimension. Namely, Held finds it 
impossible to support the Cartesian substantial dualism of the "inside" and "outside" 
world; he thinks that Gegebenheitsweise arises exactly in between these two extremes. 
(Op. cit. pp. 71-73) In short, the core of Held's thought is the thinking of the Life-
World, which eventually leads to transcending it. For in the Life-World no thinking can 
rest. In this point Held differs much from Merleau-Ponty or Schütz; he situates himself 
as a direct descendant of Hegel and Husserl. We can in this short space discuss only the 
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following two points from our perspective. 
i ) His positive statement conceming Parmenides is that to eon means ontological 
"indifference." Of course he bears Heidegger's ontological "twofold-ness" in mind, but 
his statement transcends Heidegger's. This ontological indifference is worth further 
examination, for this is the core of his appearance theory. 
ii ) His interpretation of to eon contains exactly the structural thought that results 
in reciprocally-contemporary wholeness. 
In interpreting Parmenides, Held presents many new, and remarkably interesting 
opinions. Like Fujisawa who points out the phenomenon of the infiltration of 
Aristotelianism into Platonic interpretations, Held finds the same phenomenon in his 
Parmenidesian interpretations. Getting rid of Aristotelianism means being liberated 
from the assumption that we should regard eon not only as something material but as 
the subject of a proposition. Held's characteristic interpretation of e6n is seen in his 
coinage, "das Seiend" (the nominalization of the present participle of be ). For the 
Greek participle is equipped with the verbal function (Sein = to be) as well as with the 
nominal function (Seiendes = Being). This das Seiend expresses the indifference of 
determination (Bestimmtheit) and the determined (Bestimmtes). The impossibility of 
distinguishing "determining" from "being determined" means precisely the ontological 
indifference. "Someone sleeping" (Schlafendes) does not determine someone as 
sleeping. Neither is non-determinative being determinated as "sleeping" The truth is, 
the sleeping being appears by way of being in the situation of sleeping. 
To define this ontological indifference in another way, a thing always appears 
here in this, or that determined way. Held states elsewhere that phainomenon means 
ontological indifference also because of this double meaning (verbal-nominal). 
Seiendes and Sein are put in an indiscriminate relation. In my personal opinion this 
indiscrimination is none other than a spurning of Aristotelianism, one which 
approximates Fujisawa's interpretation of Plato, though Form as the standard for 
judgment does not come to the surface in Parmenidesian indifference. 
According to Held, everything that we see in front of us lies in this ontological 
indifference, which result he skillfully uses for the renewal of interpreting the concept 
of "phenomenon" in his dissertation "Husserls Rückgang auf das phainomenon," 
(Phänomenologische Forschungen Vol. X, 1980), for phainomenon is one and the same 
thing as eon. Phainomenon signifies that a thing's appearing can not be discriminated 
from its being determined in a certain condition. One question to be solved here is-
how to find somewhere the principle of distinction, since the world is not so simply 
determined as black and white. 
Next, we can see Held's approach to ontological questions in his interpretation of 
e6n. The fundamental belief of those who maintain a naturalistic attitude, or are 
ignorant, andjust mortal is called doxa. Parmenides' intention is to transcend this doxa, 
and only by transcending it can doxa be thematized. Doxa undergoes changes of 
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growth, condition or states. As 1 already mentioned, we do not suppose a neutral 
"bearer," or substratum (hypokeimenon) in the change of these states. From the view 
point of ontological indifference, we cannot, for instance, distinguish the state of being 
cold from something cold or that of being hot from something hot. lt is possible to 
explain the world only by changes of "state-determination." Namely, the presence of 
one state means the absence of the other state. And the presence or the absence of a 
state belongs to each individual. These two exclude each other (op. cit., p.487), but at 
the same time they are "equally-ranked, reciprocally-complementary, and opposed 
states." (op. cit., p.558) Each of the states (Zustände) is one-sided, and as lang as we 
take the naturalistic attitude, we are yoked to this exclusive one-sidedness. lt is, 
however, only by noos ( direct seeing) that we can find the complete wholeness of e6n. 
The two opposites harmonize and complement each other in their common 
comprehensive system. So far as 1 understand it, this is what many structuralists 
commonly call "structure." Parmenidesian noos is reduced to structural thought. 
There are at least two major results among many others which Held has achieved 
in his voluminous book: 1) his thorough discussion of the origin of philosophy 
establishing the historical lineage of phenomenology, which has been discussed at 
random since Heidegger, and 11) his relation of his recent research on classical 
philology to phenomenological study. 
(Reprinted from the Phenomenological Inquiry, ed, by A.-T. Tymieniecka 
Belmont, Mass. U.S.A. Volume 10, October 1986, pp. 123-128) 
